Emergency Measures in Thunder Bay History

While the cold war played out between the United States and the Soviet Union, Fort William and Port Arthur sat at the centre of continental shipping and right beside North America's largest fresh water supply. Canada allied itself with other Western nations through organizations such as NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and worked with the United States on military defences through NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command).

Strategies were needed to keep Thunder Bay's citizens and other Canadians safe in the event of any type of nuclear attack. Throughout the 1960's, information was distributed in the form of pamphlets and books, describing ways to survive nuclear attacks, protect oneself from nuclear fallout, and how to obtain and organize proper emergency supplies. 

The Aircraft Detection Corps in the Lakehead

 Figure 1.                              Plate I

AN OUTLINE DRAWING SHOWING

THE PARTS OF AN AIRCRAFT

1. Navigation Light                         16. Pilot Tube (shows Air Speed)

2. Upper Wing                                  17. Leading Edge of Wing

3. Upper Aileron                              18. Lower Wing

4. Wing Center Section                  19. Machine Gun

5. Pilot's Cockpit                             20. Wheel Pants

6. Fuselage                                      21. Landing Gear Strut

7. Fin                                                 22. Wheels 

8. Rudder                                         23. Engine Cowling

9. Tail Light                                     24. Engine 

10. Elevator                                     25. Propeller Spinner

11. Stabilizer                                   26. Lower Wing

12. Tail Wheel                                 27. Center Section Strut

13. Stabilizer Strut                         28. Forward Wing Strut

14. Lower Aileron                           29. Upper Wing

15. Rear Wing Strut

The Parts of an Aircraft

[ 29 ]

World War II and Threats to the Lakehead

During World War II, the cities of Fort William and Port Arthur were the home of the Bombardier plane manufacturing plant. This meant they were threatened by enemy aircraft. The Royal Canadian Air force partnered with Bell Telephone Company and Canadian National Telegraph, set up air raid siren towers and observation posts to keep the cities safe.1 

In 1943, D.W. Ferrier, the General Traffic Manager for the R.C.A.F, contacted the Public Utilities Commission in Port Arthur to arrange an area of Port Arthur that the Aircraft Detection Corps (A.D.C.) would operate out of and the system in which they would  operate. 2  The A.D.C. was a group of mainly volunteer civilians whose job was to report on any enemy aircraft or vessels seen around the Lakehead during World War II.3 Observation posts were set up in strategic areas of Port Arthur and detection handbooks were given to observers to know how and when to send over reports to Fort William, then from there reported to Winnipeg for action.4 

Observation posts covered 124.3 kilometres and each separate one was identified by a specific code name, such as “Baffin 10”.5 The observers were all  given handbooks that would aid them in identifying potential threats, including information like aircraft markings and shapes, to the cities but these handbooks were also given to all the assisting telephone company offices so they could also make a report when needed.6

Along with having A.D.C. observers, Fort William and Port Arthur also served as distribution centres, receiving and sending calls in a radius of 141.6 kilometres.7 The Bell Telephone Company and Canadian National Telegraph would have connection points, at Kaministiquia, Sunshine, Shabaqua, Shebandowan, along with connections to Cameron Falls by radio.8 With the help of radio circuits ran by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission in Cameron Falls, long distance calls were also sent from Beardmore, Geraldton, and Long Lac, allowing more reports to be sent from Fort William to the Winnipeg regiments for documentation and action.9

Additional Images

 Figure 2.                                   PLATE XI

 National Markings 

German Aircraft

[ 39 ]

Figure 4.                 ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE 

AIRCRAFT DETECTION CORPS 

SPECIAL INFORMATION TO TELEPHONE OPERATORS 

1.                     The Aircraft Detection corps of the Royal Canadian Air Force has been formed to provide prompt and reliable reports to our Defence Forces of the approach of hostile aircraft. Its personnel consists of volunteer civilian observers, who forward these reports through the normal communication facilities of the country.

2.                     Your company has patriotically granted the use of their facilities on a priority basis, to transmit these reports. However, the success of the plan depends on the speed and accuracy with which the reports are handled between the observer and the Defence Forces, and this link in the chain in the telephone operator. 

Figure 5.     It was decided at that time that all "Aircraft Detection Corps" or "Army Flash" calls received at Port Arthur would be passed to Fort William for handling. Fort William, in turn, will route these calls to the Reporting Centre at Winnipeg, with the exception of calls received from Cameron Falls which will be routed to Sault Ste. Marie. In order that the Fort William operator will be able to recognize the calls from Cameron Falls, it was agreed that the Port Arthur operators would identify these calls in passing them to the Toll Centre. 

The decisions reached at Port Arthur have been incorporated in an Operating Practice, two copies of which are attached hereto. We are also sending a copy of this Practice to Mr. Mcdougall at Fort William, so that he can advise his operators what to expect on calls received from Port Arthur.

In addition to handling "Army Flash" calls from official observers, the R.C.A.F. have requested that telephone operators originate "Army Flash" calls themselves to report any matters which, in their judgement, should be reported and which, to their knowledge, have not already been reported by official observers. To assist them in rendering this help to the Aircraft Detection Corps, the R.C.A.F. are supplying each telephone office in the activated area a copy of the "Official Handbook for Aircraft Detection Corps", which was prepared for the use of their official observers. For your information, I am attaching a copy of this handbook, together with a letter from the Chief of Air Staff addressed to telephone operators. 

 

Figure 6. THAT after the recent incident concerning the siren alarm on the Fort William Gardens going off unexpectedly, it would seem appropriate to ask the City Clerk to investigate the channel and method of obtaining permission from the Federal Government to test the alarm sirens located throughout the City and to regularly do so with adequate public information being supplied as well.

Figure 7. We confirm the suggested arrangement whereby Port Arthur and Fort William will be listed as distributing centres. In connection with warning centres contingent to Port Arthur, we beg to advise that we have long distance telephone points on the Canadian National Railways, a distance of approximately 88 miles west of Port Arthur, as follows: Sunshine, Kaministiquia, Shabaqua, Shebandowan, Kashabowie, and we expect later to have have long distance connection as far as Atikokan where the Steep Rock Mines will be located. These points are also accessible by Canadian National Telegraphs. 

We also have long distance connection to Cameron Falls, 88 miles east of Port Arthur on the Canadian National Railways. Cameron Falls is the location of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission's generating plants totalling 129,000 horsepower, with an invested capital of around ten million dollars and are the source of power supply for the entire Lakehead district including Port Arthur, Fort William and the mining centres around Beardmore, Geraldton, etc.

Figure 8. All of the sirens in Ontario are tested annually by teams from the nearest Military Base. The maintenance of the sirens in Thunder Bay are the responsibility of Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg and 73rd Communication Group. When a team is scheduled to go out in the field the Provincial Warning Officer (continues in Figure 9). 

Stamp in lower left reads: RECEIVED / Jan 29, 1981 / City of / Thunder Bay / City Clerks Dept.  

Figure 9. is advised and he in turn then notifies the local radio stations and appropriate local authorities that siren testing will be carried out at a specified time and they are requested to advise the public of this fact. When audibly testing the sirens, they are given a growl test, that is they are started up to ensure the motor is working and shut down before they get up to speed. This is normally takes 3-5 seconds and the siren does not wail but rather gives a low tone that is not heard beyond the immediate vicinity.

Accidental soundings do unfortunately happen on occasion, caused by the environment, vandalism or line repair/maintenance, but then are the exception rather than the norm. Ontario which has in excess of 500 sirens average about 6-9 accidental soundings a year. We have effective procedures in place that can silence the offending siren in a relatively short period of time and get it back on line. 

I trust that this will satisfy your request, however if you require further information do not hesitate to contact me. 

Yours Truly / R. Lang / Major / Provincial Warning Officer

Transportation of Hazardous Materials

Around the world, many countries were facing bomb threats by both civilian and terrorist organizations, particularly beginning in the 1970s. Thunder Bay Emergency Organization decided to spearhead the issue and place Thunder Bay on the defensive.

 An introduction to the E.M.O. bomb threat plan reads: “Because changes in our society have brought about incidents of bomb threats, [a] pamphlet has been prepared to assist in the formulation of a plan in the event of a bomb threat.” This plan was to assist and maintain the security of all Thunder Bay civilians under the threat of a timed explosive device.

To combat the dangers presented by bomb threats, Thunder Bay E.M.O. published procedures (tailored to different organizations) for evacuation, the search for the device, and more. These standard procedures have changed remarkably little in intervening years. (For example, guidelines for collecting information from the caller when a bomb threat is made remain the same today.)

This brochure was issued by Canadian Bomb Data Centre in the late 1970s. The procedures here would have been used by City staff.

When a bomb threat is received:

• Listen
• Be calm and courteous
• Do not interrupt the caller
• Obtain as much information as you can
• Initiate call trace action (where possible) and notify your responsible authority by pre-arranged signal while the caller is on the line
• For telephone tracing, call: ___

Questions to ask:

• What time will the bomb explode?
• Where is it?
• Why did you place the bomb?
• What does it look like?
• Where are you calling from?
• What is your name?

Threat recipient's particulars:

•  Name
• Section/Bureau/Department
• Person to contact
• Telephone number

Recorded data:

• Date
• Time
• Duration of call

Exact wording of threat:

Identifying characteristics:

• Sex
• Estimated age
• Accent (English, French, etc)
• Voice (loud, soft, etc)
• Speech (fast, slow, etc)
• Diction (good, nasal, lisp, etc)
• Manner (calm, emotional, vulgar, etc)
• Background noises
• Voice was familiar (specify)
• Caller was familiar with area

Evacuation Guidelines:

• Keep cool
• Follow instructions of supervisor
• Remember that you have a bomb threat plan and have been trained to cope with this
• When evacuating, remove personal property, such as lunch containers, briefcases, purses, etc.

Search Guidelines:

• Search your immediate area
• Don't touch anything -- report any suspect object
• You can be of help by identifying strange or misplaced objects
• Unlock drawers, cabinets, etc. for search crew

Precautions:

Should a device or suspect device be discovered:

• Do not touch or move it
• Do not assume that it is the only one
• Do notify your control centre immediately

The Thunder Bay Emergency Measures Organization planned how to react during a disaster situation, and from time to time were required to put that planning into effect. Real-life events included a major snowstorm and a train derailment.

Snowstorm, 1977

On December 8th, 1977 at approximately 6:00 a.m., snow warnings began to sound on the radio. The Atmospheric Environment Service Weather Office warned of heavy snowfall coupled with high winds and drifting. Transportation all over the city was reduced, and rural buses were cancelled immediately.

About three hours later, a press release went out by radio predicting the effects of the storm, and stating that the situation was being handled by the Thunder Bay Area Emergency Measures Organization. School boards were contacted and local schools were closed. This was followed by the decision of the Director of Transportation to halt all public transit because of poor visibility. Thunder Bay was grinding to a halt as more snow fell.

As officials knew that a major snowstorm was coming, this news release was issued on the morning of December 8 to warn citizens of school closures and potential traffic problems.

Transcript:

News Release

9:45 – 10:00 A.M. December 8, 1977

This is John MacDonald, Public Information Officer at the Emergency Measures Headquarters building, with a report on present weather conditions.

We have been advised by the local weather office that the present conditions will continue throughout the day and into the evening hours.

City work forces are continuing to plow the major traffic arteries. Citizens are requested to refrain from driving unless it is absolutely necessary for the balance of the day.

In the area of Public Transportation, the Thunder Bay Transit Department has had to discontinue bus service on the McIntyre and Neebing bus routes. This service will be reinstated as soon as driving conditions warrant.

The E.M.O. Headquarters has been advised by the Lakehead Board of Education and the Roman Catholic Separate School Board that all city schools will be closed in order to ensure that students are sent home to avoid any serious situations. School officials will remain at the schools until all children are delivered by bus or picked up by their parents. Working mothers are requested to ensure that their children have access to their home or to a neighbour’s home. Motorists are requested to observe calendar parking restrictions in order to assist the Public Works personnel in keeping out roads passable.

To avoid traffic and possible serious situations later in the day, local industries are advised to look at the possibility of allowing their employees to leave early and avoid serious traffic situations.

This is John MacDonald, Public Information Officer at the Emergency Measures Headquarters building.

Another hour brought worse news. An update from the Weather Office suggested that more snow than originally anticipated might fall. In an attempt to relay this news to City Hall, E.M.O. co-ordinators uncovered a serious communications problem: all phone lines were in use as City staff called home, and no calls could get through. In addition to the buses, taxi companies were also closing down for safety, and some businesses and industries were shutting early so their staff could make their way home.

As the day went on, officials were able to make better predictions of how the storm would proceed. Plans for snow clearing were announced, and businesses and industries were encouraged to close early.

Transcript:

News Bulletin

This is John MacDonald reporting from the E.M.O. Headquarters.

The latest indication from the Weather Office is that the storm front has moved beyond the city but [the] snow and blowing snow will continue until [approx.] 10:00 o’clock this evening.

The Public Works crews will be working continuously through to 7:00 p.m. this evening, at which time the operators will be taken off for a rest.

Plowing will commence again at 2:00 a.m. and continue throughout the night.

Motorists are requested to refrain from driving unless it is absolutely necessary, [and obey the 2:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. parking restrictions] to plow the main arteries.

City Hall will be closing at 1:00 p.m. to-day and other commercial and industrial firms are requested to consider allowing their employees to go home at this time in order to alleviate traffic congestion at the normal rush hour.

This is John MacDonald at the EMO Headquarters.

[Handwritten:]

CFPA. OK 2:53p.m. – taped CKPR. OK [].00 p.m. taped CBQ. OK []5 p.m. – Written Chronicle Journal – [].[]5 – Written to Ian Pattison

As more and more snow fell, E.M.O., in order to set an example to private businesses, recommended the closing of City Hall. Staff contacted other communities such as Nipigon and Terrace Bay so they too would be prepared should the storm go their way. Both the Mayor and Police Departments authorized the use of snowmobiles, should they be necessary, for emergency personnel. The storm was becoming so intense that some people were forced to leave their cars on the Expressway and walk home through the snow.

The Weather Office cancelled the snow warning several hours later, but a list of snowmobilers who could assist with emergency transportation was kept on hand. The weather, now just a typical snowy day, had finally settled and Thunder Bay and its residents were safe.

This report, written several weeks after the snowstorm took place, summarizes the actions taken by emergency personnel to minimise the effects of the weather upon the city.

Thunder Bay Area Emergency Measures Organization 101 North Waterloo Street Thunder Bay, Ontario P7C 4K9 Phone 623-2711 Local 392 & 393 Co-Ordinator: E.A. Fallen

January 16th, 1978

Mr. R. E. Wainio Chief Administrative Officer City of Thunder Bay

Dear Mr. Wainio:

Re: Snowstorm 8th December, 1977

The following report on the snowstorm of 8th December is submitted.

• On arising at 0600 I heard the snow warning on the radio. I was unable to contact the Atmospheric Environment Weather Office and made a few of my own observations and come to the conclusion we could have a snowstorm.
• 0815 I arrived at my office in the E.M.O. Headquarters. I phoned the Atmospheric Environment Service Weather Office on their unlisted line. The weather forecast was not encouraging – heavy snowfall warnings with high winds and drifting. Driving in from the east via the Expressway was not bad but traffic was slowing down in the City.
• 0825 Contacted Carl Sharp, Manager of Public Works, but he had already been advised by the Weather Office.
• 0830 Mr. J. A. MacDonald, Office Services Co-ordinator, arrived in the Headquarters on his way to City Hall.
• 0845 Received phone call from Mr. Kozak, Lakehead Separate School Board. Advised him of weather forecast. He advised school buses were not running from rural areas.
• 0903 Received phone call from R. Waino. Advised him of weather forecast and that John MacDonald was here. We decided to issue a Press Release over radio stations.
• 0910 Requested John MacDonald prepare Press Release in his capacity as E.M.O. Information Officer, advising the general public of situation.

Stamp: Received Jan 17 1978, City of Thunder Bay City Clerks Dept. Handwritten: File in Rew. EMO Disaster Plan Manual

• 0920 Unable to contact J. Gerow, Lakehead Board of Education, so contacted Jeff Peat re forecast and requested they make a decision, along with the Separate School Board, re closing schools.
• 0930 Received a call from a Mr. Peter Eisenbach volunteering two snowmobiles if required.
• 0935 Advised by Ken McLean, Director of Public Transportation, that he had taken Neebing and McIntyre buses off the road because of poor visibility and road conditions.
• 0940 Checked weather forecast with Weather Office. Forecast the same as before with the addition that it was to get worse by evening. Advised Mr. Wainio of latest forecast. Mr. MacDonald advised Mr. Wainio that buses were taken off Neebing and McIntyre routes.
• 1010 Received phone call from a Mr. Richard Foster volunteering his services as a vehicle driver.
• 1015 News Release passed by J. MacDonald to CKPR, CFPA and CBQ (see Attachment #1).
• 1035 Phoned Weather Office for latest update on weather, and was informed that we could receive a greater amount of snow than was forecast. Mr. Wainio informed.
• 1045 Experiencing difficulty with telephone system in that outside lines were plugged and inside locals were being tied up. Checked with Mrs. M. Robski, Supervisor of Central Communications, and she advised that all lines were busy with calls from City Hall.
• 1100 Phoned R. Wainio to have City Hall personnel refrain from using outside lines for personal calls as they were blocking the exchange.
• 1125 Informed by Miss M. Iwaszko, receptionist at Information Desk at City Hall that all bus routes closed down and taxis would be closing down in one hour.
• 1130 Called K. McLean re situation report on buses. Advised that all buses except Neebing and McIntyre routes were operating. He advised Lakehead University and Confederation College shutting down at noon.
• 1135 Called R. Wainio with situation report. Recommended City Hall be closed as an example to private business. Advised by Mr. Wainio that this was being done.
• 1205 Received report that false information was being passed by CPR re buses. This was corrected by J. MacDonald contacting CKPR.

• 1215 J. MacDonald requested to prepare News Release re snowplowing stopping between 1900 and 0200 to allow maintenance and crew a rest, and that City Hall would be closing at 1300.
• 1220 Notified Clerks of Nipigon and Terrace Bay that they could expect storm as it was forecast to hit their region in late afternoon or early evening.
• 1235 Called Mayor Assef as requested by Mr. Wainio. Passed situation report. He authorized use of snowmobiles in the event of emergency.
• 1240 Contacted Mr. A. Main and V. Heyder re snowmobiles to be stationed at all Fire Stations. Also informed Mr. Robski at Central Communications. Notified Inspector Higgins that snowmobiles authorized and their Code was #21.
• 1235-1305 J. MacDonald issued Press Release #2. (See attachment #2).
• 1300 Contacted Brian Price re assistance from 4-Wheel Drive Club. Was referred to Mr. D. Bishop and arranged for him to have a group of Club members available. Requested he act as Co-ordinator.
• 1315 Notified Mr. Gilman, Administrator at Port Arthur General, Miss King at St. Joseph’s and Mr. McNab at McKellar of arrangements and who to contact (Mr. D. Bishop at 577-4350). Also advised them to request snowmobile assistance through central communications.
• 1330 John MacDonald volunteered to proceed to Dinty’s to purchase lunch. Returned negative lunches – Dinty’s closed due to storm. Oh well, didn’t need the food anyway.
• 1400 Storm appeared to be dying out. Called weather office for latest update. Forecast still for worsening weather and increase in winds. This was just the lull before the storm. My forecast was that it was the centre of the low pressure passing over us.
• 1500 Called Road Superintendant of Shuniah Township and was advised Lakeshore Drive passable but drifting in.
• 1605 Call from Snowmobile Co-ordinator at Central Fire Station re “standby status”. Requested they stay until 1800 when situation would be reviewed.
• 1610 Final Release to news media requesting calendar parking to be observed and to remain off streets so that plows can work without interference.

• 1615 Call from Weather Office advising Heavy Snow Warning over. Blowing snow forecast. Weather Office had passed this to all radio stations.
• 1620 Phone call from T. Fell, Director Engineering, re reasons for closing City Hall. Weather was good at this time but did deteriorate again at 1630.
• 1630-1930 Numerous calls from Central Communications re suggestions and recommendations for future problems. Many calls being received to supply transportation. Not essential.
• 2000 Call from A. Main of Sno-Surfers located Brown Street Fire Hall re standing down. Requested they stay until 2100 with a snowmobile to remain at Junot Fire Hall for transportation of a nurse at 2230. Requested a list of eight snowmobilers, with phone numbers, in the event they were needed.
• 2100 Call from A. Main with a list of names and phone numbers of snowmobilers on standby in their residences. This list passed to Central Communications.
• 2230 Call from Central Communications re transportation set-up for hospital staff. This was caused by lack of communication in hospital. Information not passed on by Administrators.
• 2330 Finally secured.

I believed this was a good exercise. There ware probably those who objected to City Hall closing but it did clear the streets of the usual traffic tie-ups at 5:00 p.m. In view of the weather forecast I would say it was a good move.

A problem which could have been more serious was the tie-up for telephone lines by the personnel in City Hall. I would recommend serious considerations be given to the restriction of Dial 9 for an outside line on a good many phones in City Hall, if this is possible. In a more serious disaster, telecommunications could be vital.

Respectfully submitted, (signed) E. A. Fallen Emergency Planning Officer

cc: Alderman W. P. McLean

Passenger Train Derailment, 1982

Just west of Red Rock, on Sunday, January 31, 1982, an eastbound VIA passenger train became derailed. The detailed report on this event states that six to eight passenger cars were completely off the rails. Emergency medical personnel were notified in both Thunder Bay and Nipigon. However, the Emergency Officer had trouble contacting Thunder Bay Ambulance, to locate the helicopter ambulance, and the Nurse's Registry.

In addition to these communication problems, the natural environment presented a challenge as well. The road nearest to the crash site had not been plowed since the last snowfall. The Emergency Planning Officer suggested that the Ministry of Transportation and Communication should plow the road as soon as possible to enable ambulance access.

Despite the challenges, the response was successful. Helicopters, ambulances, and emergency personnel were on the scene to assist those who needed help. Serious casualties were flown to Thunder Bay while some less seriously injured were treated in Nipigon. As was reported in following days, out of 89 passengers and 25 crew members, 31 people were admitted to hospital, and only 5 for overnight stays. 

This report was submitted shortly after the Emergency Measures Organization was involved in responding to a passenger train derailment near Red Rock.

 Text:

"Dear Mr. Fell:

The following is a report of my participation on behalf of the Thunder Bay Area EMO, in the derailment of the VIA passenger train on Sunday, 31 January 1982.

I received a call at 1135 at my residence from the C.P.R. dispatcher in Schreiber advising that the VIA passenger train, eastbound, had derailed at Sprucewood Siding, approximately 4 miles west of Red Rock with 6 to 8 cars off the rail. He advised the nearest open road was Everhard Road 1 1/2 miles east of the derailment. He requested I send medical personnel, ambulances and helicopters to the site. He advised that the ambulance service in Nipigon had been notified and they would be alerting the hospitals. He also gave me an emergency number of 824-2890 in the event 824-2316 was tied up.

• At 1142, I contacted Thunder Bay Ambulance to ascertain whereabouts of helicopter ambulance. They were to check and call back but never did. At 1144, tried Nurses Registry but line was busy.
• At 1145, I contacted Viking Helicopter to have them bring a helicopter to standby and that I would get back to them with further instructions.
• At 1150 I contacted the C.P.R. dispatcher, Schreiber re Viking and they advised it was to proceed direct to the site to assist with the movement of casualties.
• At 1155, I contacted Mr. M. Stockwell, Regional Manager, Provincial Ambulance Services at his home to advise him of the derailment and requesting whereabouts of his ambulance helicopter. He advised he would check and phone back.
• At 1205 Mr. Stockwell phoned back to advise the Ambulance Helicopter was on way to Hornepayne, returning a patient home. It was decided to drop the patient at the hospital in Terrace Bay and have the helicopter return to the derailment site. He also advised that two Ambulance Support Units, one from Thunder Bay and one Schreiber ..." 

Text:

• "... were on their way. I advised him a Viking helicopter was standing by at Thunder Bay Airport so it was decided he would proceed to the site in the helicopter.
• At 1210 I attempted to contact the Nurses Registry but the line was still busy. I assumed the ambulance service would alert the doctors and that doctors were available from Nipigon and Red Rock.
• At 1214 I contacted Viking Helicopters to advise them Mr. Stockwell would meet them to take some medical supplies and on his arrival, the helicopter was to proceed to the derailment site.
• At 1220 I phoned the C.P.R. dispatcher at Schreiber 824-2980 and passed information on helicopter ambulance, Viking helicopter, and ambulance support units.
• The dispatcher requested I phone O.P.P. Nipigon for them as they had been overlooked in the initial call.
• At 1228, I contacted the Ontario Provincial Police, Nipigon and advised them of the derailment. The O.P.P. dispatcher advised that they had a car proceeding to closest point and that the Sprucewood Siding Road was not plowed and the Everhard Road was only plowed to the tracks. I suggested they have the Ministry of Transportation and Communication plow the Sprucewood Siding Road to enable ambulances to get as close to the site as possible.
• At 1245, I contacted Mr. Fell with a complete situation report. At this time I was advised to contact Mr. Carl Sharp if we required any extra equipment.
• At 1335 I contacted the C.P.R. Dispatcher for a situation report and he advised that casualties were in Nipigon Hospital with the serious casualties having flown to Thunder Bay. He advised that everything was under control and that they had plenty of equipment.

He thanked me for the assistance provided.

I informed him I would be available at my residence phone number if they required anything else.

• At 1340 I considered my participation was no longer required, so proceeded with my normal Sunday routine.

I am most appreciative of the cooperation of everyone at Viking Helicopters and the Ambulance Service. Once again the benefits of pre-planning has been shown to be beneficial." 

TBA 5198-01

Conclusion

Although these emergency responses were ultimately successful, they resulted in many additional recommendations made to the E.M.O. The closure of City Hall during the snowstorm was initially controversial, but E.M.O. defended the action as helping to clear the streets of rush-hour traffic tie-ups that may have occurred later in the day. The tie-up of telephone lines led to the recommendation of new phone equipment and procedures. During a serious disaster, telecommunications would be vital.

In a real emergency situation, first responders have absolutely no time to waste. To prepare and train for potential disasters, the Emergency Measures Organization held disaster simulations that replicated possible accidents or events. Through the simulations, emergency responders gained insight to predict the behaviours of those involved (on their own staff and working with other local safety organizations), and the effectiveness of systems and technologies. Adjustments could then be made to procedures, in order to save more lives in the event of future disasters.

Who Ran These Simulations?

The Emergency Measures Organization Planning Group, which approved and outlined disaster simulations, was comprised of City departments such as Police, Fire, Parks and Recreation, and members of neighbouring communities, such Oliver Township.

During each particular simulation, roles would be assigned to City departments and specific personnel (such as the City Engineer, for example). The co-ordinators of the simulation would wrap the event up by submitting a timeline and report that would be used to study and learn from what went on. Minutes recorded at planning group meetings suggest that these reports provided a successful, useful exchange of information which overall contributed to the efficient handling of real-life emergency situations.

Simulated Airplane Crash, 1982

The simulated airplane crash at Thunder Bay Airport on September 19, 1982 proved to be beneficial to both the Emergency Measures Organization and its partner in the simulation, Transport Canada, as both parties discovered potential problems in their response procedures.

Emergency personnel discovered problems with communicating between different types of radio systems -- getting in touch with persons in authority turned out to be a complicated and time-consuming task. There were also misunderstandings over which agencies would be responsible for which tasks. Despite these shortcomings, though, the exercise was deemed a success and a credible performance of emergency response forces.

This letter summarizes the events of a 1982 training exercise that simulated an airplane crash at Thunder Bay International Airport. While some problems with response systems were encountered, this gave the Emergency Measures personnel the opportunity to improve their plans in the event of a real emergency.

"September 29, 1982 Mr. Tom Fell, Director Engineering & Operations City of Thunder Bay Memorial Avenue

Dear Mr. Fell:

The following is a report on the simulated air crash disaster at Thunder Bay Airport on 19 September 1982.

The Area E.M.O.’s participation was an assisting agency to Transport Canada.

Contrary to the reports of the news media, the exercise was not the fiasco as they claim.

There were problems at the exercise site on the airport but some of them are expected in an artificial exercise where casualties are to be placed after the initial fire fighting was completed.

From my experience at the airport, I would have to say we had too many different radio communication systems, consequently you were never in the full picture. The control at the site could have been better. The main complaint of all observers was that there was no mobile command post where those in charge could be contacted and much time was lost trying to find someone in authority.

There was a breakdown in the initial callout. In an accident on the airport, it is the responsibility of Transport Canada, assisted by the airline to notify the Hospitals, Doctors, Ambulance, this they failed to do, thinking this would be done by this Area E.M.O. Consequently, the hospitals were not aware of the exercise starting until the arrival of the detachment of Lakehead Amateur Radio Club personnel who had been alerted by this E.M.O.

The problems encountered will be dealt with and our plans will be amended.

Transport Canada will be preparing a full report on the exercise and a copy will be available at a later date."

"The main purpose of this report is to comment on the response by City of Thunder Bay personnel called out by this E.M.O.

The opportunity was taken to test our fanout system by Central Communications and the various department heads.

At 1230, I was notified by the Thunder Bay Police of the emergency and by 1255 had completed by callout and turned the E.M.O. Emergency Operating Centre over to Fire Chief J. Bryant. I then proceeded to the airport. While my place of duty would be the E.M.O. Emergency Headquarters in a disaster, for this exercise, the Airport Manager had requested I be at the airport.

I have reviewed the reports from the various departments and the telephone fan-out resulted in between 50 – 60% of key personnel would have been available. In an actual disaster, radio and T.V. would have been requested to inform personnel not contacted to contact their department.

The speed in which personnel closed up in the municipal Emergency Operating Centre was gratifying and I feel any emergency would have been expeditiously handled.

In any exercise, lessons are going to be learned and I shall be holding discussion with the key personnel to determine changes required to our plans. I will also look into the requirement of having as many personnel closing up to the Municipal Operating Centre as we had on 19 September 1982.

I would like to express my appreciation to you and all personnel who participated.

I am more than satisfied with the enthusiasm and am sure we would have put forth a credible performance in a real emergency.

Respectfully submitted,

(signed)

E.A. Fallen Emergency Planning Officer

TBA 5198-02